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In this paper. we suggest that maf!.v budget theories actually are abow appropriating and not 
about budgeting. IVe trace this development back to the classic budgeting question posed by 
VO. Keys in 19·10. To clarifY the issue, we examine early normative theories of budgeting, 
and apply many contemporary theories about budgeting to the budgeting process advocated 
for in this early work. By analyzing current theories. we show that budget theories are. in 
many cases, simply focused on parts of the budget process or on the role of techniques in de­
cision making. Our analyses suggest that rather than theories competing with each other. a 
larger metathe01:v of budgeting emerges that can accommodate these different approaches. 
Further. we identify important gaps in the literature that still needs to be addressed for a 
complete treatment of public budgeting theory. 
11.1. INTRODUCTION 
"Nearly every writer on American government has commented adversely 
on the fact that appropriations are made by congress each year without a 
budget." - Frederick A. C leve land, Chairman - Pres ident's Commission on 
Economy and Efficiency. 1 9 12 
I n  developing a metatheory of budgeting, the first and most basic, question 
is: what is the po int of a theory of  budgeting? V. 0. Key started the d iscussion 
by asking, .. On \vhat basis shall we decide to al locate x dollars to activity A 
instead of act ivity BT1 He goes on to say, "If it is assumed that an agency is 
operating at maximum effic iency, the question remains whether the function is 
worth carrying out at all. or whether it should be carried out on a reduced or 
enlarged scale. with result ing transfers of funds to or from other activities o f  
1 V. 0. Key. Jr., "The Lack of a Budgetary Theory." The American Political Science Review 
3-+. no. 6 (1940): 1 138. 
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greater or lesser soc ial ut i l ity. · ·2 Thi:; issue has guided much discussion of 
budget theory over the past seventy years. Here it is argued that the question 
itself is qu ite ambiguous. But an even larger concern is that it may be the 
wrong q uestion. For, what is a budget? How is a budget d ist inguished from 
"mere appropriating?" Here it is argued that Key· s question is not about budg­
eting. it is about appropriating, or, more specifically, that legislative action 
that predated budgeting and was intended to be replaced by the dec ision to 
budget. If Key has confused appropriating w ith budget ing. then much of the 
theory of budgeting itself is actually a theory of appropriating. Perhaps by 
framing budget theories not in terms of appropriation but instead as budgeting, 
we can more c learly see the relationship bet\veen many o f  the theories that 
have been propounded over the years and identifY areas where there is no co­
herent theory at al l .  
Table 11.1. Federal Receipts. Expenditures, and Surplus/Deficits, 1890-1916 
($in billions) 
Surplus/Deficil as % of 
Year Receiols Expenditures Survlus/Deficil Soendin" 
1890 0.46 0.38 0.08 21.05% 
1891 0.46 0.44 0.02 4.55% 
1892 0.42 0.4 0.02 5.00"/o 
1893 0.46 0.46 0 0.00"/o 
1894 0.38 0.44 -0.06 -13.64% 
1895 0.4 0.42 -0.02 -4.76% 
1896 0.42 0.44 -0.02 -4.55% 
1897 0.44 0.44 0 0.00% 
1898 0.5 0.54 -0.04 -7.41% 
1899 0.62 0.7 -0.08 -11.43% 
1900 0.66 0 62 0.04 6.45% 
1901 0.7 0.64 0.06 9.37% 
1902 0.68 0.6 0.08 13.33% 
1903 0.7 0.66 0.04 6.06% 
1904 0.68 0.72 ·0.04 -5.56% 
1905 0.7 0.72 -0.02 -2.78% 
1906 0.76 0.74 0.02 2.70% 
1907 0.84 0.76 0.08 10.53% 
1908 0.8 0.86 ·0.06 -6.98% 
1909 0.82 0.9 -0.08 -8.89% 
1910 0.9 0.92 -0.02 -2.17% 
191 I 0.94 0.92 0.02 2.17% 
1912 0.9-t 0.94 0 0.00"/o 
1913 0.98 0.98 0 0.()0% 
1914 1.02 1.02 0 0.00% 
1915 0.98 1.04 -0.06 -5.77% 
1916 1.08 1.04 0.04 3.85% 
Total, 1890-1916 18.74 18.74 0 0.00"/o 
Source: From Morns A. Copeland, "A Further Jllstoncal Rc\1ew," 111 Trends in Governmenl 
Financing, ed. Morris A. Copeland (Ann Arbor, Ml: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1961 ). 
: Ibid .. 1139. 
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11.2. WHAT IS BUDGETING AND WHAT IS ITS PURPOSE? 
I n  the late I 9th and early 20th Cent u ries, the federal governme n t  had no pub­
l ic bud get i n g  systems in place. Between 1 890 and 1916 (the year in which the 
US entered World War I and s i gnific ant ly increased federal expenditures on 
th is e ffort). the federal gove rnment es sent ially broke even fma nc ia l ly. With in 
th is breakeven period, however, annual surpluses or deficits were relat ive ly 
pronounced and varied. For exam ple wh ile the gove rnment re ported nearly a 
fourteen percent deficit in 1894, it sho wed a thirteen percent surplus in 1902. 
On the other hand. state and local governments ran increasi n gly larger defi­
c its. Thro u gh 1 9 16, state and local  gove rnments ran o perat ing defic its that av­
eraged between t hree and e leven perc ent of annual s pend i n g.3 Further. whi le 
the federal gove rnment 's share of s pend in g  relative to gross domestic product 
(G OP) was decl in in g durin g this period of t ime , state and local gove rnment 
s pendi n g  relat ive to GDP was actually increasin g. 
The lack of plan n in g by governments became a c o ncern for reformers dur­
in g this t ime. C it ies and states s pent mil l ions of dollars annually ·'w ith litt le or 
no thought as to where it was comin g fi·om or what they were getting for it " 
whi le the federal gover nment was in its '·heyday of ·pork barrel' era. ''4 As not­
ed by C leveland. the ·'u ncontrolled and  u ncontrollable increase in the cost of 
government" demanded that governments ado pt bud get processes to e nsure 
democratic trans parency. 5 I n  other wor ds .  there was a growin g sense that the 
lack of financial plann i n g  in govern m ent was lead ing to corru ption that . in  
tu rn, was contributi n g  s i gnificant ly to these annual de ficits. The process of 
bud geting - of systemat ically planni n g  the finances of  governments - was 
viewed as hel ping to el iminate these defic its  and seemin gly u nethical behav­
iors of le gis latures ; in other words, i mplement in g bud get i n g  processes \vas 
expected to create better o utcomes for gove rnments. This notion of  desired 
outcomes is at the core o f the public bud getin g traditio n ,  or it should be. 
I n  this same tradition. Goodnow argues that budgetin g is not just a plan for 
how money is s pe nt o r  a ppro priated. Rather. the first ste p in the bud getin g 
process is a princ i pa l  expressing a desired outcome to an a gent.6 He su ggests 
that the pr inc i pal  in this case is the le gisla ture. duly e lected by the po pulation. 
3 Morris A. Copeland. "A Further Historical Review." in Trends in Governmelll Financing, ed. 
Morris A. Copeland (Ann Arbor, MI :  University of Michigan Press. 1961 ). 
� Arthur Eugene Buck, "The Development of the Budget Idea in the United States." The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 113. no. M ay ( 1924 ): 81. 
5 Frederick Albert Cleveland. "Evolution of the Budget Idea in the United States," The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 62. no. November ( 1915). 
6 Frank J. Goodnow, "The Limit of Budgetary Control," Proceedings of the American 
Political Science Association 9( 1912). 
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The budget process 's starting point, then, is fundamenta l ly an expression of  
publ ic goals to  agency heads. But  just as important i s  that the agent (public 
agency officials) must report back to the principal (the legislature) what was 
accomp l ished towards these public goals. Therefore, budgeting is not just 
about planning which activit ies of government are funded and by how much 
(how much is al located to activity A instead of activity B). but a lso requires an 
accounting ofvvhether public goals were met or not. Stated in more contempo­
rary terms. budget ing requires some measure of performance by wh ich public 
managers are evaluated. When agents fa i l  to meet the establ ished and agreed 
upon goals. the principals reduce the d iscret ion of these agents. This m ight 
include reducing the fund ing of the agency, or it m ight mean shifting budget­
ing from goals (that is, performance) to l ine- item restrict ions. In th is under­
standing of budget ing. l ine- items remove budgetary d iscret ion from the agent. 
rather than maintain ing a lump sum performance-based budget. Agents have 
an incentive to meet established goals to avoid losing such d iscret ion. 
Goodnow's description of budgeting - which predates Key by over three 
decades - is important because it suggests something that may be lost in the 
ambiguity of Key's quest ion. Budget theory should not just explain ho\v mon­
ey is d istributed w ith in government, but also why budgets should aid in meet­
ing public p lans and goals. I n  other words, budget theory ought to explain 
more than appropriat ion decis ions; it should also explain what the establ ished 
goals of a government are, how these goals are measured, and how the system 
controls operations to meet these goals. 
In some respects. this reflects the writ ings of C leveland as \veil. Budgeting 
and appropriat ing are d ifferent act ivit ies of government - or perhaps more cor­
rectly. budgeting invo lves appropriating, but not only appropriating. For budg­
eting certa in ly requ ires the appropriat ing of publ ic moneys for specific activi­
ties (X versus Y): but barring a means to consider a p lan for publ ic activities. 
then government act ivit ies are not budgeted - they are simply financed and 
appropriated. Further. a budget requires report ing to account for the ste\vard­
ship of publ ic resources. I n  do ing so. the budget provides a snapshot of the 
government's financial condition. Goodnow and C leveland are. in some re­
spects. advocates for a rational model of budget ing. in which goa ls are set. re­
sources are allocated to reach these goals, the legis lature approves of the plan. 
and agency officials implement the budget plan; results are then compared to 
p lan during the year. adjustments are made (budget modifications), and these 
inform the formation of the subsequent budget. However, few would argue 
that the rat ional budget model explains or predicts public budgeting in the 
least.7 However. the importance of the theories of Goodno\v and C leveland 
rests not in the accuracy of the description of the budgeting process. but in-
7 Robert D. Lee and Ronald Wayne Johnson. Public budgeting systems. 6th ed. (Gaithersburg. 
Md.: Aspen Publishers. 1 998). 
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stead as an expansion o f  Key· s question regard ing public budget ing. Stated 
another way, their theoretical contribution is that any theory of budgeting 
needs to exp lain not just appropriation decisions, but also how goals are set. 
measured. and achieved (or why not). 
Table 1 1.2 sum arizes the work of Buck, C leve land. and Goodnow that 
describes who is involved in budget decisions. how goals are set, and ho\v re­
su lts are measured for determination of success or fai lure. Importantly, these 
theories present a normat ive theory or budgeting because they describe a co m­
p lete budgetary process. Appropriating decis ions are certainly part of these 
processes - described generally in row 3 of Table 2. However. the authors are 
quite clear that appropriations and budget ing are not synonymous terms -
Buck cal ls them · •separate and d ist inct documents, although they are often 
confo unded'':8 C leveland notes that appropriations routinely occur without a 
budget;9 and Goodnow infers that Congress appropriates for specific act ivities 
or objects of expenditures despite lacking budgets. Therefore. where Keys de­
tines budgeting as appropriat ing, earlier theorists noted the d istinction. Yet, 
for nearly a century. a normat ive theory of budgeting (as opposed to mere ap­
propriat ing) has existed to guide further theoretical development. 
11.3. POST-KEY BUDGET THEORIES 
Two prominent budget theories emerged during the 1 950s. F irst, there is 
the theory expounded by Verne Lewis: 10 
l .  S ince resources are scarce in relation to demands. the basic economic test 
which must be appl ied is that the return from every expend iture must be worth 
its cost in terms o f  sacrificed alternatives. Budget analys is. therefore. is bas i­
cally a comparison of the relat ive merits of a lternative uses of funds. 
2. Incremental analys is (that is. analys is of the add it iona l  values to be derived 
from an add itional expenditure) is necessary because o f  the phenomenon of 
diminishing ut i l ity. Analysis o f the increments is necessary and usefu l only at 
or near the margin; th is is the point of balance at \Vhich an additional expend i­
ture for any purpose would yield the same return. 
3. Comparison o f re lative merits can be made only in terms o f  relative effec­
t iveness in achieving a common objective. 
Lewis argues that agencies shou ld produce alternative budgets that show 
the effect of marginal changes in the agency's  expenditures - that is. budget 
for continuing at the same level and at s l ightly h igher and lower levels - so 
8 Buck. "The Development of the Budget Idea in the United States," 38. 
9 Cleveland, "Evolution of the Budget Idea in the United States." 47. 
10 Verne B. Lewis. "Toward a Theory of Budgeting." Public Administration Review 12, no. I 
( 1 952): 42. 
I 
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that decision makers can purchase tl)e basket of goods that best reflects their 
preferences. Lewis's theory can be classified as rational or even hyper­
rational, re lying on the maximum reasoning capacity of both the bureaucrat 
and the decis ion maker. L ike the early theories of Buck, C leveland, and 
Goodnow, Lewis's theory is a lso normative, because it recommends a process 
for participants in the budget process to fo llow. L ike the earlier normative the­
ories, therefore, it is not intended to be a description of what actual ly happens 
during budgeting. U n l ike the early theories d iscussed, however, Lewis does 
not expl icit ly consider the entire budgetary process of goal setting and perfor­
mance measurement. 
Table I 1.2. Normative Thcorv of a Bud!!et 1912 to 1915 
Buck Cleveland· Goodnow-· 
I Responsible executive Plan Must Be Made by a Responsible It is believed that the demands of legislative 
leadership E xecutiVe-accountable for the man· control and of admimstrative efficiency \\111 
agement of the affairs of the whole be reconciled if proviston is made for the 
government rendering to the budget making authorit)' by 
2. Staff assistance the eStimates must be made b)' n great admmistrative uuthonties of such detailed, 
many persons The estimate of needs comprehensive mtelligtble accounts of ex-
must be made by persons who arc pendnures and of work done as \\ill permit 
famthar with the requirements of each the budget making authoril)' to reach an 
kmd of work to be done tntelhgent JUdgment both as to efficiency of 
3 Broad and accurate Estimates of resources admmistration and as to conformity by the 
budget information admmtstrattve authonttes to the expressed 
\\ill of the budget makmg authoritv 
4 Complete budget plan Esumates of needs Character of activtt\' [program\ 
Object of expenditurefaccounting codel 
S Building and im· 
provement program 
6 Open procedure by means of enabling representatiYes to The question, therefore, presents itself how 
rc:sponsrble legislative inquire mto the requests for future may the demands for an effective legislative 
body 2rants control over executive action be satisfied 
letting the people know what has been without sacrificrng administmtive enicien· 
done and \\hat ts proposed and of cy' It mav be assumed that this control wtll 
getung controversies between a ma· be based on the power to make appropria-
Joril)' of repcesentatives and the exec· lions 
utlve before the electorate for final 
dectsion 
! 7 A financial calendar Penod authorized 
8. Effective control over Budget Control by the Representative Suppose the budget making authonl)' 
the execution of the Bodv were not convinced that tts mandates had 
budget plan means of enabling representatives to been heeded or that the admmistralion had 
find out whether the executive �.as been effictent [ W]hat can the budget 
acted withm his past authori111tions making authority do? There are practically 
and conducted the business eniciently ordy two things. These are, first, it may 
specify items of future appropriations in 
great detatl Or. second, tt may (cut] 
down or [refuse] altogether appropnations 
for [unsatisfactory] services until those 
persons in charge . have severed therr 
connection \\ith the government. 
At the end of  the fift ies, Charles L indblom 14 proposes that pol icy deci­
sions are made not through a means-ends reasoning process, but through an 
1 1  Buck. "The Development ofthe Budget Idea in the United States." 
1� Cleveland. "Evolution of the Budget Idea in the United States." 
13 Goodnow, ''The Limit of Budgetary Control." 
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iterative experient ia l ly corrective process. \Vh ich he labe ls successive l imited 
comparison. He asserts that this is the preferable method of po l icy making be­
cause means-ends reason ing re l ies on theoretica l  reason ing. wh ich. for him, 
means pred ict ing the consequences of actions w ithout the aid of experience 
and which , he asserts. peo ple do qu ite poorly. Two other im portant com po ­
nents are that ( I) the o bject o f  po I icy mak ing i s  agreement and (2) both the 
methods and the e nds o f po lic ies are selected in the process of seeking agree­
ment. As pro posed by L indblom th is is a theory of po l icy making. but Aaron 
Wildavsky and col leagues ado pted it as a theory of budgeting. 15 Lindblom's 
view is  essent ia lly an extens ion o f  Her bert S imon 's theory of bounded rat io n ­
a l ity. 16 S imon argues that decision mak ers have too few resources - particu lar ­
ly , they have too l itt le t ime - to make comprehensive rat ional dec is io ns as 
called for in c lass ic econom ic theory. L indblom adds that decision makers are 
not smart enough to make such dec is ions - that is. when they rely on theories 
about what happe ns without having experience to su pport the theories, they 
are l ikely to be wrong. 
While Lindblo m 's account has a sharply normative flavor .  Wi ldavsky and 
colleagues ado pt the out l ines of the theory for descript ive pur poses. They as­
sert that there is too much informat ion to handle in  a budget cyc le ,  so dec isio n  
makers must ado pt sim pl i fication strate gies for successfu l  dec ision making. 
Whi le ado pt ing S imon-l ike reason ing wit h  respect to the lack of resources, 
they more c lose ly reflect Lindblom when t hey argue. "There is. however , little 
or no theory in  most areas of  po l icy whi ch would enable pract itioners to pre ­
dict the consequences o f  alternative moves and the probab i l ity of  their occur­
r ing. ' 17 They ado pt a variant of incr ementa l ism , "Incremental calculatio ns 
proceed from an exist ing base . . . .  The w ides pread sharing of dee ply held e x ­
pectations concern ing the organizat ion 's base provides a po wer ful (although 
informal) means of securing stabi l it y."18 They exam ine this form of incremen ­
talism w ith regression models, finding confirmat ion o fthe ir descr ipt ive  model. 
As LeLou p documents. these regress ion models have s ince become d iscredit­
ed ;19 as one exam ple. the variables inc luded in the analys is - such as agency 
1• Charles Edward Lindblom. "The Science of "Muddling Through"," Public Administration 
Review 19. no. 2 (1959). 
15 Aaron B. Wildavsky. The politics of the budgetary process (Boston,: Little. 1964): Otto A. 
Davis, M. A. H. Dempster. and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process." The 
American Political Science Review 60, no. 3 ( 1966): Aaron B. Wildavsky. "Political 
Implications of Budgetary Refom1." Public Administration Review 2 1 ,  no. 4 (1961). 
16 Herbert Alexander Simon, Administrative behavior: a swdy of decision-making processes in 
administrative organization. 2d ed. (New York.: Macmillan. 1957). 
17 Davis. Dempster. and Aaron Wildavsky. "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," 529. 
18 Ibid. 530 
19 Lance T. Leloup, "From Microbudgeting to Macrobudgeting: Evolution in Theory and 
Practice." in New Directions in Budget Theory. ed. I rene S. Rubin (Albany: State University 
of New York Press. 1988). 
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budgetary requests and final budgetary appropriations - are genera l ly highly 
correlated. leading to the empirical support ofthe theory. 
Incrementa l ism is about as sharply different from Lewis's marginal ut i l ity 
model as two theories can be. I ncrementalism is non-rat ionaL Dec isions do not 
depend on the reasoning capacity of the decision maker. but on steps taken to 
simpl ify the decision process and avoid hard decis ion  making. Un l ike L ind­
blom's notion of incrementalism - in which incremental changes are recom­
mended because of decis ion makers· constraints - Wi ldavsky's theory of in­
cremental ism is inherent ly posit ive and describes observed phenomena. Budg­
et theory suggests. therefore. that some authors make strong recommendations 
for fbture behavior (that is. normat ive theory) whi le others observe the budg­
etary process or actors and describe these observations (that is. positive theo­
ry). In both cases. however, we describe each as · 'budget theory'· even though 
the goals of each type of theory is very distinct: the normative w ishes to rec­
ommend good or best practices for part or all of the budgetary process, while 
the posit ive is interested in explain ing what and why part or al l  of  the budget­
ary process happens. 
11.4. FROM NORMATIVE TO POSITIVE IN HISTORICAL 
CONTEXT 
This shift from the early normative theories of  Buck. Goodnow, and Cleve­
land to the posit ive theories post-Keys is unsurprising when p laced in h istori­
cal context. Budget ing was not formal ized at the federal level unti l  1923. fo )­
lowed by states and municipalities en masse. The normative theories argued 
that budgeting was critical for democratic government and accountability. Fo l­
lowing the sociaL economic, and po l it ical upheavals of the 1 930s and 1 940s. 
budget theorists were no longer advocating for budgeting, but were instead 
examining budget ing - or parts of budgeting - as it existed. 
We categorize significant budget theories and theories related to budgetary 
issues into several d istinct traditions in Table 3. Descr iptions of  inc luded 
budget theories are found in Appendix A. First. the rows of Table 3 d ivide 
budgetary theories into the ' ·Prescriptive·· and the •·Posit ive:· Prescriptive the­
ories inc lude those that have been described as normat ive. In add ition. we in­
c lude instrumental theor ies that reflect normative guides but a lso provide rec­
ommended methods to achieve the intended results. As an example, zero­
based budgeting (ZBB) requires agencies to justify their existence (and spend­
ing) every budget cycle.20 In theory, this method requ ires princ ipals ( legis la­
tures) to approve of public goals, determine how much should be appropriated 
to meet these goals. evaluate how agents are accompl ishing these goals. and 
:o (Lee and Johnson. 1998) 
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hold these agents accountable for their performance. I t  is normat ive in that 
recommends behavior. but also provides the method for attaining goals. 
In contrast to these prescriptive theories are the posit ive theories. We dis­
t ingu ish between descriptive and explanatory positive theories. Whereas the 
descript ive mere ly notes what is observed, explanatory theories also show how 
or why some budgetary behavior occurs. For example, the greedy bureaucrat 
theory of Niskanen describes bureaucrats who seek to increase their level of 
spending: by increasing their d iscretionary budgets. these bureaucrats maxim­
ize their own uti l ity (through larger staffs, increased pay, etc.) rather than that 
ofthe publ ic.2 1  This theory seeks to not only describe what is observed (ineffi­
cient public spending). but also why this theory occurs in real ity. 
Existing budget theories are not merely prescriptive or  positive. however. 
Table 8.3 also considers the role of budget execution in existing budget theory. 
We d istingu ish here between the hyper-rational, the rationa� the quasi­
rational, the non-rational. and the anti-rational. I n  the hyper-rational, the budg­
etary technique itself  d ictates the u lt imate budgetary decision. Returning to the 
ZBB example, an agency unable to justifY its ex istence is simply defunded and 
ceases to exist. The techn ique (budget justification) l inearly determines the 
budgetary decision .  
I n  contrast, the rat ional d imension largely re l ies on specific techniques 
(perhaps even recommended techniques); however. these techn iques contrib­
ute information to the decision making process of budget ing. but do not make 
the determinat ion itself. For example, l ine item budget ing provides info r­
mation on how money is spent within departments. agencies. and organiza­
tions. Decision makers may decide to change these amounts. a lter l ine items. 
or both to attain some particular goal. Unl ike the hyper-rational. however, 
there are no built-in decision criteria and decision makers must determine such 
appropriat ions ult imately. 
The quasi-rational is closely re lated to the rational d imension: whereas the 
rat ional contributes to budgetary decis ion making, quasi-rat ional provides in­
formation to inform the decision. The dec ision makers ( legis lature, executive. 
or both) may consider other information as wel l  (that may even re ly upon dif-. 
ferent techniques). For example. workforce size budgets involve agencies jus­
tifYing the number o f  employees working for the agency. Rather than decision 
makers simply determining that a certain number of employees are requ ired to 
meet some publ ic goal. this workforce size budget informs the decision maker 
a long with other informat ion as wel l  (such as cost effect iveness. as one exam­
p le). 
:I (1971) 
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Table 11.3. Two Dimensions of Bud2et and Bufl2et-Related Theories 
Hyper- Rational Qu2si-Rational Non-Rational Anti-Rational 
Rational 
Classic Early Budget Satisficing Incrementalism 
Economic Literature Optimum Deci- -Lindblom 
N Man \Vhy A instead sions 
0 Marginality ofB? Mixed Scanning R Portfolio Ke}nesianism Responsibility M 
Theory Comprehensive Budgeting A 
T Budgeting 
p I Executive Budg-




R ZBB Line Item Budg- BEA Gramm-
I Cost- et Nonconventional Rudman-
p I Benefit Hoover Perf. budgets Hollings T N Analysis Budgeting Workforce size I s 
v T ECB Program Budget- budgets 
E R ing 
u PPBS 
M MBO 
E TBB N PB, PBB T 




D Rational Macrobudgeting Organi7.ational Incrementalism- Ambiguity& 
E Policy Empirical Norms Process Wildavsky Interpretive s Model Authorization Punctuated Budgets c 
Process Equilibrium R 
I Principle-Agent Rights Based 
p Economic Func- Budgeting 
p T tions of Budget Bureaucratic 
0 I Budget Strategies Politics 
s v Super Budgets TCP 
I E 
T E Median Voter Garbage Can Greedy Bureau-
I X Theory Agendas crat v p Interest Group Real Time 
E L 
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Table 11.4. Applvill2 Buck's Bud2ct Theon to Currcntl\ormatin Bud cta11 Theories 
Buck c M p E 
E A T B 
M R L 
G 
I. Responsible cxccu- ../ 
tive leadership 
2. Staff assistance i ../ ../ 
3. Broad and accurate ../ 
budget infonnation 
../ ../ 
4. Complete budget ../ ../ ../ ../ 
plan 
5. Building and im- ../ 
provcment program 
6. Open procedure by 
responsible legislative ../ 
body 
7. A financial calendar ../ 
8. Effective control 
over the execution of ../ 
the bud.Rct plan 
Other 












E T B 
B D u 
../ ../ 
../ ../ 
../ ../ ../ 
../ ../ ../ 
� 
../ 
R R R 
Table ll..ta. Symbols for Tables 4 through 7 
../ =present, called for in theory or very strongly implied 
i = implied by the theory. but not strongly 
x = denied by the theory 
../• =present, but with limitations, for row: 
3, broad or accurate, not both, 
4, the theory defines complete, 
6, legislative process, but not necessarily open 
? = Unclear, possibly 
P =Partially true 
Blank=Unaddressed 
See Appendix A for column labels. 
Labels in the bottom row are the first letter of column labels from Table 3 
s 0 M R 
A D s B 
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../ ../ 
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The non-rational essential ly starts with a decision and is indifferent to the 
techniques used to get there. For example, in the 1 990s, Gramm-Rudman­
Hollings (GRH) was a federal effort to reduce deficit spend ing. I f  decision 
makers (Congress and the President) were unable to reduce budgetary deficits 
and eventually reach budget balance, then GRH would reduce or cancel cer­
tain budgetary expenditures. The goa l  (reduced deficit spending and. eventua l­
ly, a ba lanced budget) was primary for GRH; decision makers were viewed 
a lmost as incapable of reaching this goal. Hence, any technique was valid as 
long as the end result was in l ine with the goal. 
Final ly, the anti-rational d imension suggests that rational techniques and 
analysis are excluded from or even possibly rejected in the decision making 
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process. Return ing to the greedy bureaucrat theory. rational techniques might 
suggest that an agency's approved spending be reduced to where t he margina l  
benefit of  o utput equals the marginal cost o f  that output. However, such ra­
t ionality is rejected by not only the bureaucrat seeking increased funds, but 
decision makers who must ultimately approve these fu nds. Perhaps the budget 
is set where total benefits equals total cost (which leads to oversupply), or per­
haps it is set to some other arbitrary number; the point is that rational analysis 
plays no role in the ultimate appropriation decis ion. 
8.5. ARE EXISTING THEORIES REALLY ABOUT BUDGETING, OR 
JUST A PARTICULAR ASPECT OF BUDGETING? 
As posited earlier in this paper, we contend that the confusion and lack of  
c larity in  Key· s seminal work on public budgeting has had the unfortunate re­
sult that current budget theories often focus on parts of budgeting rather than 
the entire process. I f  we use Buck's normative framework from Table 2 as a 
starting point, budget theory ought to examine more than appropriating deci­
sions a lo ne; rather, it should (at the least) incorporate elements of budget 
preparation as well as budget decision events. Table 4 examines the normative 
theories in light of Buck's normative budgetary framework. The first column 
represents Buck ·s eight budgetary steps; the top row includes all budget theo­
ries categorized in Table 8.3 as '·normative." We then ascertain whether each 
current budgetary theory includes Buck's normative elements. 
We then undertake a similar analysis for the current instrumental, descriptive. 
and explanatory theories in Tables 8 .5-8.7, respectively. Considering Buck's 
normative framework for budgeting, Key's question appears ambiguous in 
several important aspects. What type of budget ing techniques is Key alluding 
to when he discusses the ··basis'" for decision making? Is it one in which the 
decision is made by the technique (the hyper-rational). merely informs the de­
cision (the quasi-rational), or is the total spending level already determined 
and the basis merely supports the fmal  predetermined decision (anti-rational)? 
Does ·'we·· refer to t he legis lature. a specific chamber of the legislature, an ex­
ecutive, the agency staff, the electorate, or the committees involved in reco n­
ciling budgetary differences between legislative and executive proposals? 
When is the allocation. only at the appropriating moment or also in the pre­
legislative executive preparation process and post- legislative implementation 
and rebudgeting process? When Key·s discusses the act of ··allocation:· does 
he include how activity A and activity B are measured. and how goals are 
known to be attained? These ambiguities can lead to very d ifferent budgetary 
theories because t hey lead to very different conceptions as to what public 
budgeting is. I n  fact, when one examines Tables 4 through 8, it becomes quite 
clear that prescriptive theories of budgeting (that is, normative and 
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Table 11.5. Applying Buck's Budget Theory to Current Instrumental (Practices) 
Budeetarv Theories 
Buck z c E L H p p M T p B 0 B G N w 
B B c I p R p B B B p B E R 0 0 
B A B B B 0 B 0 8 A H N R 
G s K 
I. Responsible execu-
i p i i i 
tive leadership 
i i � i ? i 
2. Staff assistance � � i � ,/ � � � � � � � � � � 
3. Broad and accurate 
budget information 
� ,/ ,/ p � ,/ � � � ,/ ,/ � � ,/ 
4. Complete budget ,/ ,/ p ,/ � ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ � 
plan 
5. Building and im- ,/ ? 
_provement proJUam • 
6. Open procedure by ,/ 
responsible legislative ,/ • 
body 
7. A financial calendar i ,/ ,/ ,/ 
8. Effective control 
over the execution of i ? p p p p 
the bu<lget_plao 
Other 
Rational H H H R R R R R R R R R Q N Q Q 
Table 11.6. A JPbill2 Buck's Rudeet Theory to Cun·ent Descriptive Bude:etar Theories 
Buck R M N 0 A p E B s I p R B T A 
p A 0 p p A c s B N E B u CP M 




executive leader- � ,/ ,/ ,/ ? ? 
shiiJ. 
2. Staff assistance � i ,/ � � ? ? ? 
3. Broad and ac- X 
curate budget ,/ ,/ ? ? X 
information (i) 
4. Complete i ? ? 
budget plan 
5. Building and 
improvement 
progrartl 
6. Open procedure � ,/ ,/ 
by responsible ,/ ? �· �· ,/• �· ? • • • 
lelrislative body 





trol over the exe-
p ,/ ? 
cution of the 
X i X ? 
budget plan 
Other 
Rational H R R Q Q Q Q Q Q N N N N N A 
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instrumental theories) largely focus on the budget preparation phase of the 
budget process, while posit ive theories (that is, descriptive and explanatory 
theories) largely focus on the legislative appropriation event. In this respect, 
these seemingly competing categories of theories are really just concerned 
with different aspects of the same budget cycle. 
Tahle 11.7. Applying Buck's Budget Theory to Current Explanatory 
Budeetarv Theories 
Buck M I G A R G 
v G c G T R 
T p E 8 E 
N E 
D 
I. Responsible executive 
leadership 
2. Staff assistance i i I ./ 
3. Broad and accurate " ? ? " 
budget infom1ation 
4. Complete budget plan ? ? " 
5. Building and improve-
ment pro111am 
6. Open procedure by re-
sp_onsible legislative body 
./ ./• ./• ./• ./• ./• 
7. A financial calendar 
8. Effective control over 
the execution of the budget " 
plan 
Other 
Rational Q Q N N N A 
By extension, the role of  reason and planning (that is. how "rational 
.. dec i­
s ion making is cons idered or fa ils to be considered) also seem relevant for d if­
fering parts of  the ent ire budget process. Prescript ive theories are predom i­
nantly hyper-rational. rationaL or quasi-rat ional In these theories, techniques 
for decision making are important - even dominant in some cases (such as 
cost-benefit analys is. as one example). Because these theories are essent ially 
recommendations. m ild or otherwise. for future participants in the budgeting 
or appropriat ing process, these techniques then aid in max imizing social util i­
ty. On the other hand. posit ive theories - perhaps because they are concerned 
with descr ibing or explain ing what exists -are defmed predominantly by the 
quasi-rational or non-rational. Whereas prescriptive theories essent ially desire 
budgeting to take on an air of science, the posit ive reminds us that the role of  
interested parties renders budget ing inherently an imperfect science. 
11.6. SOMETHING BORROWED, SOMETHING NEW 
Another way to categorize competing budget theories locuses on whether 
the theory was developed specifically to analyze public budgeting ("'native 
theories") or instead to analyze some other phenomena and later adapted to 
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publ ic budget ing ('·borrowed theories''). We categorize theories based on this 
aspect as well as by the '·rational ity" of the theory. These categorizations are 
presented in Tables 8 . 8a through 8 .8d below. 
Tables 8 .8a-8.8d suggest that native theories tend towards the rational. 
whi le borrowed theories tend towards the quas i-rational or non-rat ional. S imi­
larly, the native theories are genera l ly focused on the budget preparation stage. 
whi le the borrowed theories are generally focused on the budget decision 
event. 
Table ll.Sa. Normative Table I t.Sb. lmtrumen tal 
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The preceding analyses also suggests that a l l  budget theories in general -
including the early normative work of Buck, C leveland. and Goodnow -large-
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ly treat budget execution as an afterthought at best. Rebudgeting. dynamic re­
adjustments (such as m id-year budget modificat ions to incorporate changing 
economic assumpt ions). and legacy promises that are d ifficu lt or impossible to 
a lter s ignificantly ( for example, retirement benefits) have no c lear p lace in 
budget theory. Yet. these issues of execution are crit ica l for successful budget 
management. For example, if legacy promises comprise a s ign ificant share of 
a budget. then dec ision makers are largely unable to influence a s ignificant 
share the current budget. The notion of ·'who'· dec ides which activit ies to fund, 
therefore. seems to include not just current decision makers. but also may in­
c lude intertemporal considerations as well .  
Further. budget theories tend to ignore the nested budgeting occurring with­
in governmental organizations. I nstead. they focus a lmost entirely on budget­
ing at the top level - by legis latures and/or executives. Most of the actual 
budgetary decisions, tradeoffs. and ana lyses, however, depend upon these 
nested budget ing levels. That is, not only do top level actors make dec is ions, 
but agency heads and staff are involved in what proposals are made. how they 
are costed. how much effort wi l l  go into them, etc. This involvement and ef­
fort of staff is described, for example, in Thurmaier & Wil loughby. 22 The real­
ity of the nested nature of public budgeting further revea ls the ambigu ity of  
"who" is making the decision i n  Key's question. 
8.7. CONCLUSION 
In a well-known tale, a group of b l indfo lded men touch an e lephant to dis­
cover what it is. Each is able to touch only a s ingle part, and the men compare 
their experiences afterwards. Al l  bel ieve they have described different animals 
and disagreement ensues. In real ity, they have all touched and described the 
same e lephant, although the differences between the exper iences suggest to 
them that they are completely d ifferent. In a simi lar ve in. budget theory has 
suffered from d ifferent groups ·'touching•· d ifferent aspects of the budgeting 
process. 
I n  analyzing exist ing budget theories, we begin to show how these different 
budget theories can be grouped into taxonomies based on rationality and also 
the techniques used or proscribed. In do ing so, we do not claim to have deve l ­
oped a new budget theory: instead, we propose that these seemingly contradic­
tory and incomplete budget theories in fact fit together. In laying out prescrip­
tive theories or analyzing positive theories, these various authors are not so 
much d isproving each other's work as bui lding the whole "e lephant." We trace 
much of this conf\Js ion  to the ambiguity of Key's c lassic statement about 
budgeting in several of the important concepts in h is dec laration ("On what 
basis shal l  we decide to al locate x dol lars to activity A instead of act ivity B?''). 
22 (200J b, p. 51-52) 
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Also. we note that appropriation and budget ing are frequently used synony­
mously in budget theories. Yet. as shown by early normative authors. appro­
priation can eas ily occur even without budgeting. 
This theory of exist ing theories - a metatheory of budget ing - is usefu l  be­
cause it a l lows us to assess where existing gaps remain and future work can be 
most he lpful. I ndeed. important issues in contemporary budgeting are com­
p letely unaddressed by exist ing theories. For examp le. a l l  theories currently 
assume that appropriat ions or budgets wi l l  be approved and implemented; the 
federal government. as well  as several important states (such as Ne\v York). 
have long histories of budget stalemates where budgets may not exist for 
months at a time. Also, budget theories genera lly treat a l l  spending as equaL I n  
reality. certain program areas - such as funding for war o r  national defense -
are frequently given preferent ial  budgetary treatment by decision makers. 
Such funding is rarely reduced and frequently increased. Yet no existing theo­
ry can adequately expla in this rea l ity of "sacred cow" budgeting. On a related 
note. public budgeting has become a battleground for broader ideological d is­
agreements over the proper role of government in society. I ssues that may be 
economically insignificant for the budget as a whole (such as funding for the 
arts. earmarks. mass transit, as examples at the federal leve l) serve as stand-ins 
for this battle. This ··symbo l ic" budgeting is certainly driven by d ifferent be­
l iefs about the goals of government and budget ing. Yet we know litt le about 
th is important development. Also. \Ve know little about how · ·patronage"' 
budget ing - in which public money is steered towards spec ific goals, agencies, 
vendors and local it ies ( inside and outside government) - operates. Such pat­
ronage is especial ly relevant at the subnat ional level where publ ic contracts 
are often steered towards pol it ica l ly connected groups. For example. in New 
York City, one counci l  member was forced to resign and serve jai l  t ime after 
admitting to steering publ ic money to a not-for-profrt group operated by fami­
ly members: at the state level. a prominent Assembly member has fought ac­
cusations for decades that his not-for-profit group - the rec ipient of s ign ificant 
pub l ic largesse - is s imply a personal s lush fund. The greedy bureaucrat theo­
ry seems somehow re levant to explaining these, yet Niskanen's theory focuses 
only on the internal agency bureaucrat and does not seem able to explain how 
external agents and elected polit ic ians can also engage in such behavior. Al l  in 
a l�  this beginn in g  of a metatheory suggests that despite the progress we have 
made in understanding budgeting. th is po l icy arena cont inues to develop, re­
quiring theory to continually develop with it. 
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APPENDIX A 
BRIEF DESCRIPTIONS OF BUDGET THEORIES IN TABLE 3 
NORMATIVE THEORIES 
Classic Econom ic Man (CEM) - "Economic man has a complete and con­
s istent system of preferences that a l lows h im a lways to choose among the a l­
ternatives open to h im;  he is a lways completely aware of what these alterna­
tives are: there are no l imits on the complexity of the computations he can per­
form in order to detennine which a lternat ives are best: probabi l ity calcu lations 
are neither frightening nor mysterious to him:'23 
Marginality (MARG) - The use of "incremental analys is'· as d iscussed by 
Verne Lewis24 to compare programs or other budget elements at t he ir margins 
to provide the capacity to increase the total ut i lity of the budget. 
Portfo l io Theory (PT) - The use of the private sector device known as port­
fo l io theory to increase the .. expected return" of the activit ies of government. 
. . Expected return" is operationalized in terms of quant ities of desired outcome 
units. The goa l  is to maximize uti l ity by ach ieving the maximum achievable 
joint return in a l l  programs with in exist ing constraints.25 
Early Budget L iterature (EBL) - The view of Goodnow. C leveland and 
Buck as discussed in the main text. See the eight essent ial characteristics in 
Table I .  
Why A instead of B? ( A  or B) - V. 0. Key26 asks . . .  O n  what basis shal l \Ve 
decide to a l locate x dol lars to activity A instead of activity B?" He goes on to 
say. '·If it is assumed that an agency is operat ing at maximum effic iency. the 
question remains whether t he function is worth carrying out at a l l, or whether 
it should be carried out on a reduced or enlarged scale, with result ing transfers 
of funds to or from other activities of greater or lesser social ut i l ity:'27 While 
this is a demand for a theory. it is also a rudimentary theory, one that suggests 
that budgeting is a problem of economic al locat ion . 
�3 Herbert Alexander Simon, Administrative behavior: a study of decision-making processes in 
administrative organization. 3d ed (New York: Free Press, 1976). xxvii. 
24 Lewis, "Toward a Theory of Budgeting." 
25 Aman Khan. "Budgets and Portfolios." in Budget Theory in the Public Sector, ed. Aman 
Kahn and W. Bartley Hildreth (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books. 2002). 
�6 Key, "The Lack of a Budgetary Theory." 1138. 
27 Ibid .. 1 1 39. 
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Keynesianism - John Maynard Keynes28 argues t hat the jurisdict ion-wide 
economy is subject to cycl ical behavior that must be balanced by governmen­
tal fiscal behavior. When the economy is underperforming, the government -
as buyer of last resort - should borrow as necessary to create demand and in­
crease economic performance, primarily through increas ing employment. The 
point of this is to soften the trough of economic cycles. The role of the budget 
ceases to be to fund the operations of government. except secondarily. I ts pri­
mary purpose is as a fiscal device to modulate the economy. 
Comprehensive Budgeting (CB) - The word ""comprehensive·· appears 
most frequently in budget d iscussion as an adject ive without defin it ion. There 
are four ways in which a budget can be comprehensive : ( 1 )  B udgets can com­
pletely address al l  aspects of financ ial resources by avo iding ""off budget"" de­
vices. In th is respect .  the federal budget of the United States and the budget of 
the C ity of New York are not comprehensive as they have devices for spend­
ing money that are not subject to budgetary review. (2) Budgets can provide 
al l  the types of information that budget users or budget academics th ink should 
be in a budget. Presumably. a comprehensive information budget would have 
o ld-style performance data. new-style outcomes data, program data, some 
marginal effect data. and, of course. financ ial data, p lus explanatory tex1. (3) 
Budgets can comprehensively address the ent ire budget period: the last com­
pleted period: the current. incomplete period; the budget year: and one or two 
outlook years. ( 4) Budgets can address al l  the potent ially scare resources of 
the jurisdiction: money. staffing levels. space, and anything else that might be 
scarce. In  addit ion to these four dimensions of comprehensiveness. compre­
hensive budgets may also make extensive use of analysis. 
Executive Budget (EB) - A progressive era v iew that has developed and 
expanded throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century; modeled 
on the corporat ion, the CEO is in charge of the government and the legis lature 
serves as the corporate board. According to this p lan, the execut ive prepares a 
budget and presents it to the legislature who then acts on it. I n  differing ver­
sions across the United States th is legis lat ive action can range from rubber 
stamping, to modest reduction with no authority to increase expenditures, to 
latent or actual capac ity to completely revamp the budgetary proposal before 
ak. h 
. . 29 m mg t e appropnat1on. 
::s John Maynard Keynes, The general theory of employment, interest and money (Atlantic 
Publishers & Distributors, 2006): Eric M. Patashnik. " Ideas. Inheritances. and the D)11amics 
of Budgetary Change." Governance 1 2, no. 2 ( 1 999). 
29 Cleveland. "Evolution of the Budget Idea in the United States."; Goodnow, "The Limit of 
Budgetary Control.": Paul L. Posner. "The Continuity of Change: Public Budgeting and 
Finance Reforms over 70 Years." Public Administration Review 67. no. 6 (2007): Wi lliam 
Franklin Willoughby, "Allotment of Funds by Executive Officials. An Essential Feature of 
any Correct Budgetary System," Proceedings of American Political Science Association 9. no. 
Ninth Annual Meeting ( 1 9 1 2). 
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Top-Down/Bottom-Up Budget ing-Top-down (TO) budgeting is dominated 
by top members of the executive branch and the legislative branch. Decisions 
made by these top ranked actors inc lude such matters as targets for programs 
or departments. Lower ranked dec isions are sharply constrained by these top 
down decis ions. Bottom-up (BU) budget ing builds the case for funding from 
the lower funct ional levels of the organ izations and aggregates up to the total 
budget.30 Top-down budget ing may seek to prevent  unwanted proposals and 
require desired proposals in bottom-up submissions. 
Satisficing (SAT) - Because the adm in istrator is l im ited in his abi l ity to 
perform and his abi l ity to make correct decisions by such th ings as l im iting 
dispositions, l imited values. and lim ited resources for decision making. the 
admin istrator should perform analys is and examine options sufficient ly to 
make a good enough decision. Once a dec ision seems good enough. further 
effort is ineffect ive. Herbert Sirnon3 1  labels the dec is ion makers' l im itations 
· ·bounded rational ity.' · and the consequential real istic dec is io n  procedure, · ·sat­
isficing.·· 
I ncrementalism (INC) - Charles L indblom32 proposes that policy decisions 
are made not through a means-ends reasoning process. but through an iterative 
experiential ly corrective process. which he labels successive l imited compari­
son. He asserts that this is the preferable method of pol icy making because 
means-ends reasoning relies on theoretical reasoning. which. for him, means 
predicting the consequences of actions w ithout the a id of experience and 
which, he asserts, people do quite poorly. Two other important components 
are that ( 1) the object of po I icy making is agreement and (2) both the methods 
and the ends of pol icies (not the methods alone) are selected in the process of 
seeking agreement. As proposed by L indblom this is a theory of po l icy mak­
ing. but Aaron Wildavsky and col leagues33 adopted it as a theory of budgeting. 
Opt imum Decisions (00) - Yehezkel Dror34 says: 
- Some clarificat ion of  values. objectives, and dec ision-criteria. 
30 Barry Bozeman and Jeffrey D. Straussman, "Shrinking Budgets and the Shrinkage of 
Budget Theory," Public Administration Review 42, no. 6 ( 1 982). 
31 Simon. Administrative behavior: a study of decision-making processes in administrative 
organization. 
32 Lindblom, "The Science of"Muddling Through"." 
33 Wildavsky. The politics of the budgetary process: Davis, Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, 
"A Theory of the Budgetary Process.": Wildavsky. "Political Implications of Budgetary 
Reform." 
34 Yehezkel Dror. " Muddling Through-"Science" or Inertia?." Public Administration Review 
24. no. 3 (1964): 1 56. 
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- Identification of  a lternatives, accompanied by a conscious effort to consider 
new alternatives (through survey of comparative l iterature. experience and 
avai lable theories) and to stimu late creative alternative innovation. 
- Pre l iminary estimation of expected pay-off of various a lternatives and dec i­
sions whether a strategy of m in imal risk or a strategy of innovation is pre f­
erable. 
If the first, the "successive l imited comparison" model should be fol lowed. 
I f  the latter, the next e lement is establ ishment of a cut-off for considering 
possible results of a lternative pol icies and identification of main expected 
results, relying on available know ledge and intu it ion. 
- The test of the optimum po l icy is that it is agreed upon by the various ana­
lysts after ful l  and frank discussion of stages 1 to 4. 
- A conscious effort is made to decide whether the problem is important 
enough to make analysis more comprehensive. 
- Theory and experience. rationality and extrarat ional ity a l l  are relied upon. 
the composition of the mLx depending upon their avai labi l ity  and the nature 
ofthe problem. 
- Exp licit arrangements are made to improve the quality of  po l icy making 
through systematic learning from experience, stimulat ion of in itiative and 
creativity. staff development and encouragement of inte l lectual effort. 
M ixed Scanning (MS) - For Jesser decis ions, problems that are not severe, 
or minor corrections of d irection, fol low an approach that resembles or is in­
crementalism. For more significant dec ision-making. pursue a strategy that 
resembles comprehensive rational ity. 35  
Responsibi l ity Budgeting - L. R. Jones and Fred Thompson fo l lowing 
Robert Anthony say:36 
Classify al l  admin istrative unit s  as either mission or support centers. 
Charge a l l  costs accrued by support centers . . .  to the m ission  centers they 
serve. 
Fund mission centers to cover the ir expected expenses - inc luding support 
center charges. 
Establish a working capital fund to provide short-term financing for support 
units. 
Establish a capital asset fund . . . .  
H Amitai Etzioni ,  "Mixed-Scanning: A "TI1ird" Approach to Decision-Making," Public 
Administration Review 27, no. 5 ( 1 967). 
36 L. R. Jones and Fred Thompson. "Responsibi l i ty Budgeting and Accounting Reform." in 
Budget Theory in the Public Sector, ed. Aman Kahn and W. Bartley Hildreth (Westport, 
Connecticut: Quorum Books. 2002), 1 46; Robert Newton Anthony. "New Frontiers in 
Defense Financial Management." The Federal Accountant, no. I I  ( 1 962). 
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Based on this descript ion. responsibi l ity budgeting is a form of program 
budget ing where on ly cost centers that serve the purpose of the organization 
are funded d irect ly. Support services must · 'earn'· their funds by providing 
support. Jones and Thompson also describe this form of budgeting as not en­
gaging in detailed budgeting at the responsibi l ity center level, instead manag­
ers at that level have both responsibil ity and discretion to achieve purposes 
with funds provided. 
INSTRUMENTAL THEORIES 
Zero Base Budget ing (ZBB) - I n  the public sector, ZBB is generally 
thought to fol low the concepts of marginality promoted by Verne Lewis. To 
accompl ish this, a budget for a ftmction, d ivision. or other component of gov­
ernment is del ivered at several levels: one below the current funding leve l ,  one 
equal to the current funding level, and one or more above the current funding 
level .  With each, the packet shows what the component can accompl ish with 
its funds. The decision maker is then able to select a package that increases 
total ut i l ity over the prior year 's ut i l ity. 37 
Cost-Benefit Analys is (CBA) - Also cal led Benefit-Cost Analysis. refers to 
comput ing all costs and all benefits of a program and subtracting benefits from 
costs (net) or representing the two as a ratio with benefits shown as the numer­
ator and values above one showing a gain.38 Variat ions include: 
• Net Present Value (NPV). wh ich brings a l l  costs and benefits to the pre­
sent period by applying an appropriate d iscount rate before calculat ing the 
net value. 39 
• Cost Effect iveness Analysis (CEA), which compares two or more pro­
posals that are taken to have the same benefit so lely on their costs.40 
• Life Cycle Costing (LCC). which is a form of cost effectiveness analys is 
that assures that purchasing decisions consider not only capital costs, but 
also costs of operation. 41 LCC has been ex1ended to many other uses and 
could be considered to be comprehensive NPV. 
37 Donald Axelrod. Budgeting/or modem Government, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1 995). 
38 Daniele Capone and Daniel W. Wil liams, "The History of Evaluation through Regulatory 
Impact Analysis: a Path from Accounting to Accountabil ity," Journal of International 
Business 3, no. I (20 I I ). 
39 lbid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Greg Chen. Daniel W. Williams, and Trocls Pind Adrian, "Life Cycle Costing," in 
Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy, Second Edition. ed. Jack Rabin 
(Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis, 2008). 
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• Regulatory I mpact Analysis (RIA). which appl ies CBA or NPV to the 
evaluation ofregulat ions.42 
Expenditure Control B udgeting (ECB) - ··ECB has five general operating 
elements. F irst. ECB uses a 'base" budget to determine  the appropriation for 
the next fiscal year. The base budget is annua l ly adjusted for population 
growth and changes in the cost of l iving. Second, ECB assumes exist ing ser­
vice levels and requires the c ity manager and c ity counc i l  to approve any 
changes in service levels. It also permits the c ity manager to transfer a l loca­
tions among departments within the overa l l  appropriations level to correct m i­
nor imbalances in funding. Third, department d irectors are responsible for 
costs of future increases in progran1ming as wel l  as for increases in service 
levels. Retained savings generated by the department provide the funds used 
for such service expansions. Fourth, each year's under expend itures are carried 
forward to the next year. Fifth, depatiments are required to budget administra­
t ively at the line- item level .  ''43 
Line Item B udgeting (LIB) - Th is theory of budgeting, or more strictly. of 
appropriat ing, predated early twentieth century budget reforms and was. in 
part, what some of those reformers intended to replace.44 The appropriat ing 
authority funds expenditures in extreme detail focused on the resources to be 
purchased by government, which are now known as objects of expenditure. 
Employees may be funded by name or position in the appropriat ion. 
Hoover Performance Budgeting (HPB) - Performance is demonstrated 
through cost effectiveness, which means that budget documents contain exten­
sive cost-per-unit data at the homogenous work activity level. Homogenous 
work act ivities are qu ite detai led much more so than programs. A Hoover per­
formance budget addresses the question whether government is gett ing the 
most for its money in terms of price for work produced.45 This form of budget 
requires accurate and ex1ens ive cost accounting information. Performance 
B udgeting is impl icit ly associated with the systems model. which transferred 
from engineering to operations research/management sc ience at approximately 
the same t ime:46 
42 Capone and Wil l iams, "The History of Evaluation through Regulatory Impact Analysis: a 
Path from Accounting to Accountabil ity." 
43 Eric B. Herzik, "Improving Budgetary Management and Fostering Innovation: Expenditure 
Control Budgeting." Public Productivity and Management Review 14. no. 3 ( 1991 ) : 24 1 .  
44 Goodnow, "The Limit of Budgetary Control." 
45 Arthur Eugene Buck, "Performance Budgeting for the Federal Government," Tax Review X. 
no. 7 (1949). 
46 J. W. Mauchly, "TI1e advantages of built-in checking" ( 1953): Richard Bellman, 
"Mathematical Aspects of Scheduling Theory," Jo�;rnal of the Society for Industrial and 
Applied Mathematics 4. no. 3 ( 1956); George B. Dantzig, "Thoughts on Linear Programming 
and Automation." Management Science 3, no. 2 ( 1957). 
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I nput-7 Throughput-? Output-70utcome 
This model has many variations related to feedback loops and external en­
vironmental impact (open systems). It is, itse lf, a sophist ication of the s imple 
input/output concepts of Frederick Taylor.47 It  is impl icated in a number of 
instrumental theories. 
Program B udget ing (PROG) - A program budget is a system wide exami­
nation of the purposes of government with technical evaluat ion of the ut i l ity­
cost of progran1 results considering alternatives to achieve resu lts. Programs 
are broader than departments and can be cross-cutt ing. that is. found in part in 
d ifferent departments. ( In  practice, programs are found within departments or 
are departments.) Part of the point of program budgeting is to allow economic 
evaluation of means of achieving goals between d ifferent programs that may 
be found in different sectors.48 
Planning. Programm ing and Budgeting Systems (PPBS) - PPBS, some­
t imes just PPB, refers to the integration of techniques such as cost benefit 
analysis. policy analysis, performance budget ing, program budget ing. etc .. to 
produce a comprehensive approach to budgeting. PPBS is c losely associated 
with Program Budget ing (see). TI1is approach was considered successful at the 
Department of Defense during the 1 960s.49 It is general ly thought that when 
the federal government expanded this approach government-wide. it fa i led. 50 
Sometimes it is asserted that various e lements of PPBS remain scattered 
across government. 
Management by Objectives (MBO) - MBO is a management theory. but it 
is called a budget related theory by Irene Rubin5 1  among others. In  the budget 
context, it calls for a practice of setting object ives, setting pr iorit ies. then al lo­
cating resources according to those objectives and priorities. 52 A variant Ia-
47 F.W. Taylor, Shop management (Harper & Brothers. 1 9 1 1 ); F.W. Taylor. "Scientific 
management," New York ( 1 9 1 1 ). 
48 Arthur Smithies, "Conceptual Framework for Program Budgeting," in Program Budgeting, 
ed. David Novick (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1 965). 
49 Fremont James Lyden and George A. Shipman. "Developments in Public Administration." 
Public Administration Review 26, no. I ( 1 966). 
so Aaron B. Wildavsky. "Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS," Public Administration 
Review 29, no. 2 ( 1 969). 
SI Irene S. Rubin, "Budget Theory and Budget Practice: How Good the Fit?." Public 
Administration Review 50. no. 2 ( 1 990). 
s2 Peter F. Drucker, "What Results Should You Expect? A Users' Guide to MBO," Public 
Administration Review 36. no. I ( 1 976). 
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beled results based budgeting may be assoc iated with the systems model. see 
the entry for Hoover Perfom1ance Budgeting. 53 
Target Base Budgeting - TBB is a variant of ZBB that is less information 
intensive. A base with  appropriate adjustments is set at the beginning of the 
budget submiss ion process. Departments are generally prohibited from asking 
for more fimds than in the target base, but are given (some) d iscretion to pro­
pose reallocation o f  funds w ithin the ir own d iscretionary activit ies. Thus. mar­
ginal tradeoffs are made by the department heads whi le preparing their budget 
submission. Final approval passes through the executive and legis lative pro­
cesses.54 
1 990s Performance Budgeting- PB. also cal led Performance Based Budgeting 
(PBB, not to be confused with PPB). comes in three forms: presentational, where per­
formance information is included in the text of the budget proposal: performance in­
formed, where future resources are l inked to future performance targets or results: 
and d irect performance budgeting. where "the al location of resources directly and 
explicitly to units of performance. general ly outputs.''55 PB rel ies on the systems 
model; see the entry for Hoover Performance Budgeting. 
Best Pract ices (BP) - Roy Meyers recommends:56 
A budget process should be: 
1 .  Comprehensive - inc ludes all uses of the government's financial resources: 
2. Honest - based on unbiased projections; 
3. Perceptive - considers the long-term as wel l  as the near-tern1; 
4. Constrained - l imits the amount of money that need be acquired by the gov-
ernment: 
5. Judgmental- seeks ways of obtain ing the most effects for the least costs: 
6. Cooperative - does not dominate other important dec is ion processes: 
7. Timely - completes regular tasks when expected, 
8 .  Transparent - is understandable without intensive effort: 
9 .  Legit imate - reserves important decis ions to legally-appropriate authorities. 
I O.Responsive - adopts pol ic ies that match public preferences 
Outcome Budget ing (OB) - A  variant of MBO or performance budget ing 
that asks the top decis ion maker to pay for what is desired, that is outcomes, 
rather than resources needed ( l ine- item budgeting), detailed managerial costs 
53 Peter F. Drucker. Alan aging for results; economic tasks and risk-taking decisions, [ I  st ed. 
(New York.: Harper & Row. 1 964). 
54 Thomas W. Wenz and Ann P. Nolan, "Budgeting for the Future: Target Base Budgeting." 
Public Budgeting & Finance 2, no. 2 { 1 982). 
55 Teresa Curristine and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. eds., 
Performance budgeting in OECD countries (Paris: OECD. 2007), 2 1 .  
56 Roy T .  Meyers. "ls There a Key t o  the Normative Budgeting Lock?," Policy Sciences 29, 
no. 3 ( 1 996): 176. 
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(Hoover Performance Budget ing), or planning (program budget ing). Out­
comes budget ing is another theory that re l ies on the systems model of budget­
ing, see the entry for Hoover Performance Budgeting. 57 
Budget Enforcement Act of 1 990 (BEA) - BEA (a US federal Jaw) is a re­
form to Gramm-Rudman-Hol l ings (see). "BEA has three sets of ru les: adjust­
able deficit targets. caps on discretionary spending. and pay-as-you-go 
(PAYGO) ru les for revenues and d irect spending."58 The deficit targets are set 
in law, but can be adjusted during the annual budget process. PA YGO refers 
to the process of requ ir ing appropriating committees to self- fu nd new expendi­
tures. general ly by reducing other expenditures w ithin the ir domain. Thus, 
BEA is a variant of program budgeting, but also see Rights Based B udgeting. 
Nonconventional budgets (NON) - Gerald l'vli l ler says. ·'In governments 
across the world, we find not only the traditional cal l  for a separate capital 
budget but also cal ls for a tax expenditure budget. a mandate budget. a regula­
tory budget. a credit budget. and an insurance budget.'' 59 M i l ler l inks this idea 
to super- ( in the sense of comprehensive) budgets. He suggests the purpose of 
these sorts of budgets is control, which he says have five e lements: focus, at­
tention from decision makers; estimation, determi n ing the cost of the resource 
for requested projects in a budget period: scarcity. setting a ce i l ing for the 
avai lab i l ity of the budgeted resource: criteria, determin in g  ru les or permiss ible 
justifications for se lection among projects that demand the resource: a nd a de­
v ice for reaching decis ions. 
Workforce S ize Budgets (WORK) -A version of nonconvent ional budget­
ing (see) that may be more common than many is the workforce s ize budget. 
In the federal government, workforce s ize budget ing cons ists of agenc ies just i­
fy ing their staffing level to OMB.60 Anecdotal information known to the au­
thors shows that some state and local governments spec i fy  maximum work­
force s ize in their respective appropriations, but this practice is not well repre­
sented in the l iterature. A sophist icated version of th is pract ice calcu lates 
workforce s ize at annual ized fu l l  t ime equ ivalency. A w idely known method 
of evading this type of budget constraint is the h iring consu ltants from temp 
57 La\\Tcnce L Martin. "Budgeting for Outcome." in Budget Theory in 1he Public Sector. ed. 
Am an Kahn and W. Bartley Hildreth (Westport. Connecticut: Quorum Books. 2002). 
58 Allen Schick, The federal Budget: politics, policy, process (Washington. D.C.: Brookings 
Institution. 1 995). 39. 
59 Gerald J. Mil ler. "Nonconventional Budgets: Interpreting Budgets and Budgeting 
Interpretations," in Budget Theory in the Public Sector, ed. Aman Kahn and W. Bartley 
Hildreth (Westport. Connecticut: Quorum Books, 2002), 77. 
60 Peter M. Benda and Charles H. Levine. "The Assignment and Institutionalization of 
Functions at OMB: Lessons from Two Cases in Work-Force Management," in New Directions 
in Budget Theory. ed. Irene S. Rubin (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1 988). 
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agencies, where these consultants function l ike regular employees but are not 
on the regular payro ll.  
Gramm-Rudman-Hol l ings (GRH) - The Balance Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1 985. better kno·wn as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings . . . called for the pro­
gressive reduction in  the deficit in each fiscal year from 1 9 86 through 1 990 and for a 
balanced budget in 1 99 1 .  It a lso provided for the cancellation of budget resources if 
the projected deficit exceeded the target by more than an al lowed amount:'61 This 
device treated decision-makers as incapable of reaching satisfactory decisions. thus, 
automatic devices would be used to force appropriates in the satisfactory level in the 
budget implementation stage. 
DESCRIPTIVE THEORIES 
Rational Po licy Mode l (RPM) - Graham A l l ison62 describes three ap­
proaches to decisio n  making. The rat ional po l icy model assumes that the dec i­
sions are rational. In it ia l ly goals and objectives are determined. Options are 
identified. The consequence of each option is thoroughly evalu ated. Based o n  
these options. the value-maximizing opt ion is selected. The Rat ional Pol icy 
Model is a descriptive vers ion o f C lass ic Economic Man (see). A l l ison·s  two 
alternatives are Organizat ion Process (see) and Bureaucratic Pol it ics (see). 
Macrobudgeting ( MAC) - At the macrolevel, budgeting is comprehensive 
top-dovm budget ing aimed at control l ing system w ide contro llable expend i­
tures. Key participants are the executive and the top comm ittee members, that 
is. the most powerful  members of both the execut ive and legislat ive branches 
of government. The process is centralized. There is increased use of mult i-year 
decis ions. Formal ized devices such as B EA and GRH are used. The legislative 
decision process is transparent.63 
Empirical Norms (NORM) - Budgets a l locate funds to categories of ser­
vice. By examining numerous commun ities one can determine reasonable ex­
pectat ions for per unit expenditure for typical services de l ivered by communi­
ties. The selection of unit depends on the type of service. 64 
61 Schick, The federal Budget: politics, policy, process: 39. 
61 Graham T. Allison. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The American 
Political Science Review 63, no. 3 ( 1 969): Graham T. All ison, Essence of decision; explaining 
the Cuban missile crisis (Boston,: Little. 1 97 1  ). 
63 Leloup. "From Microbudgeting to Macrobudgeting: Evolution in Theory and Practice.": 
Lance T. Leloup. "Budget Theory for a New Century." in Budget Theory in the Public Sector, 
cd. Aman Kahn and W. Bartley Hildreth (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 2002). 
6-1 Mabel L. Walker, Municipal Expenditures, vol. Extra Volumes, Johns Hopkins University 
Studies in Historical and Political Science New Series, No. 1 3  (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1930): Julia Beckett, "Early Budget Theory: The Progressive Theory of Public 
Expenditures," in Budget Theory in the Public Sector. ed. Aman Kahn and W. Bartley 
204 Williams & Calabrese 
Organizat iona l  Process (OP) - Governments are a loose coal it io n  of  organ­
izat ions in factional debate w ith parochial concerns. Decisions are constrained 
by organizat ional norms of acceptable action. Problems are addressed sequen­
tially. Organ izations use standard operating procedures (SOPs) and c lusters of 
SOPs to resolve problems. They seek to avoid uncertainty by contro l l ing their 
environment. For non-rout ine problems. they search for \Vays to apply their 
existing capacit ies and they general ly do not change over t ime except under 
extreme conditions. The loose coa l it ion of organizations creates a conflict be­
tween decentral ized act ion and centralized coordination. Organizations tend 
towards incrementa l  change. 6; Mark Green and Fred Thompson use the organ­
izational process concept to discuss budget process as an u nderstanding of S i­
mon. Lindblom and W ildavsky.66 Fo l lo w ing John Crecine67 they discuss the 
role of inst itut ional  p layers such as the mayor, who form parts of what Al lison 
called a loose coalit ion, and the routines fo l lowed in budgeting (SOPs and 
c lusters of SOPs). Efforts to reduce complexity parallel  the object ive of con­
tra l l ing uncertainty. 
Authorizat ion Process (AP) - Authorizing comm ittees interact w ith and 
sometimes compete wit h  appropriat ing committees. Appropriat ing committees 
may take roles of authorizing comm ittees when authorizing committees are 
moving too s low ly for the appropriations calendar. Where the act iv it ies to be 
authorized are controversiaL the encroachment may be in the opposite d irec­
t ion.68 
Princ iple-Agent (PA) - The budget reflects a princ i p le-agent relationship. 
which has the characteristics of  hierarchy, goal conflict, and informat ion 
asymmetry. Princ ipals make demands on resources of agents, who ration their 
resources for princ ipals - that is. princ i�als make demands that agents comply 
w·ith only to the degree that they must.6 Under all three principal-agent cond i­
tions one can expect ··agency dominance," (see Greedy Bureaucrat""). A lterna­
t ive understandings reflect " legislat ive dominance." where the legislature does 
Hildreth (Westport. Connecticut: Quorum Books. 2002): Daniel W. Wi lliams, "Evolution of 
Performance Measurement to 1 930." Administration and Societv 36, no. 2 (2004). 
65 Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.';; Allison. Essence of decision; 
explaining the Cuban missile crisis. 
66 Mark T. Green and Fred Thompson, "Organizational Process Models of Budgeting," in 
Evolving Theories of Public Budgeting. ed. John R. Bartle (Amsterdam: JAI imprint, 200 I ). 
67 John P. Crecine. Governmental problem-solving; a computer simulation of municipal 
budgeting, American politics research series (Chicago,: Rand McNally. 1 969). 
68 Irene S. Rubin. "The Authorization Process: ln�plications for Budget Theory." in New 
Directions in Budget Theory, ed. Irene S. Rubin (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 
1 988). 
69 John P. Forrester, "The Principal-Agent Model and Budget Theory." in Budget Theory in 
the Public Sector, ed. Aman Kahn and W. Bartley Hildreth (Westport. Connecticut: Quorum 
Books. 2002): Goodnow, "The Limit of Budgetary Control." 
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not fully reveal its preferences, thus gaining the upper hand in negotiations; 
"executive dominance:· largely reflecting the preclearance budget submission 
process through an executive central budget office that centralizes. coordi­
nates, and officia l ly submits the budget to the legislature; and "issue net­
works." where members of the legislature and members of interest groups join 
together to control aspects of dec ision making. 
Economic funct ions of budgeting (ECO) - There are three basic economic 
functions of budgeting: al location, the governmental budget can a l locate goods 
when markets fa i l  due to the existence of public or collective consumption 
goods, external it ies. natural monopol ies, or consumer ignorance: d istribution, 
the governmental  budget can serve to redistribute goods where market condi­
tions create extreme economic inequality; and stab i l ization, the government 
budget can reduce the effect of economic cyc les (see Keynesian ism). 70 
Budget Strategies (BS) - Agencies are more successfu l  in their budgeting 
when they consider the publ ic support for their programs. Under four levels of 
support there are d iffering optimal internal strategies (proposals) and external 
strategies ( legislat ive pol it ics): Broad weak support for outcomes leads to in­
cremental  proposals and transparent cooperat ive legis lat ive strategies. Narrow 
intense support leads to c laims for equity and re l iance on the c lientele in the 
polit ical process. Moderate resistance to financing targeted strategies. such as 
cutting waste or sharp focus on mission, and to confidence building in the po­
litical environment .  H igh resistance to outcomes leads to analytic or other 
strong approaches. such as cost benefit analysis. and to ex1ernal strategies fo­
cused on d ivid ing power.7 1  
Super Budgets (SB) - ··super-budgets are conceived less as  documents or 
even as autonomous processes than as systems, interacting with other systems. 
At their core l ies the fundamenta l revenue mobilization and expenditure func­
tion. but they are also an integral part of other systems, include the intergov­
ernmental system, the economic system, and the po l it ical-bureaucratic sys-
t . .  n em. 
Punctuated Equil ibrium (PE) - Budgets are generally stable fol lowing the 
construct of incrementalism or, in any case, not changing rad ically in most pe-
70 Merl M. Hackbart and James B. Ramsey, "The Theory of Public Sector Budget: An 
Economic Perspective." in Budget Theory in the Public Sector. ed. Aman Kahn and W. 
Bartley Hildreth (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 2002). 
71 Marcia L. Whicker and Changhwan Mo, "The Impact of Agency Mission on Agency 
Budget Strategy: A Deductive Theory," in Budget Theory in the Public Sector, cd. Aman 
Kahn and W. Bartley Hi ldreth (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 2002). 
7=' Naomi Caiden. "Shaping Things to Come: Super-Budgeters as Heroes (and Heroines) in the 
Late-Twentieth CcntUI)'," in New Directions in Budget Theory, ed. Irene S. Rubin (Albany: 
State University of New York Press. I 988), 48 .. 
.. 
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riods. However, aperiod ical ly stabi l ity is d isturbed. This d isturbance may be 
consistent w ith the Agendas theory (see) or w ith M ixed Scanning (see). Ev i­
dence exists for such aperiodic budgeting. 73 
R ights Based Budgeting (RBB) - The existence of large transfer payment 
programs that the courts have interpreted as ent it lements and the engagement 
of the courts in requ iring the expenditure of funds to fu l fi l l  court determined 
rights has narrowed the execut ive- legislative d iscretion over the budget creat­
ing a rigid obl igat ion to expend funds. One method of managing budgets is to 
take a long-term look at entit lements.74 
Bureaucratic Pol it ics (BUR) - The government comprises indiv iduals who 
are p layers in the dec isio n-making process. P layers are focused on parochial 
priorities and they seek to protect their own interests and maint ain the ir own 
power. Strategic decis io ns are replaced by focus on matters demanding imme­
d iate attention. There are routine •·channels" for determining who decides and 
how to proceed. Decisions are not analyt ic  or calcu lated, they are the part of 
the uncertainty. pace and chaotic nature of dec is ion making. Decision out­
comes are the aggregate of mult ip le individual dec isions. Group actions may 
not reflect any part icu lar person's  intentions. Part ic ipants· roles affect their . 
d 75 JU gment. 
Transaction Cost Pol it ics (TCP) - John Bartle and Jun Ma76 explore TCP 
theories related to budgeting. Fo l lowing Patashnik77 they v iew budgets as 
contracts and see three transaction cost c la ims: 78 
( I )  The costs of negat ing and enforc ing budget contracts shape the 
budgetary process. and through it, the budgetary outcome: 
(2) Po l it ical  actors del iberately craft institutional safeguards to add du­
rabi l ity to the ir commitments; and 
73 Meagan M. Jordan. "Punctuated Equilibrium: An Agenda-Based Theory of Budgeting. " in 
Budget The01y in the Public Sector. ed. Aman Kahn and W. Bartley Hi ldreth (Westport. 
Connecticut: Quorum Books. 2002). 
74 Jeffrey D. Straussman. "Rights-Based Budgeting." in New Directions in Budget Theory, ed. 
Irene S. Rubin (Albany: State University of New York Press. 1 988). 
75 Allison. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.": All ison, Essence of decision; 
explaining the Cuban missile crisis. 
76 John R. Bartle and Jun Ma, "Applying Transaction Cost Theory IO Public Budgeting and 
Finance." in Evolving Theories of Public Budgeti11g, ed. John R. Bartle (Amsterdam: JAI 
imprint, 200 I ). 
77 Eric M. Patashnik, "The Contractual Nature of Budgeting: A Transaction Cost Perspective 
on the Design of Budgeting Institutions." Policy Sciences 29. no. 3 ( 1 9%). 
78 Bartle and Ma, "Applying Transaction Cost Theory to Public Budgeting and Finance." 162. 
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(3) Budget reforms are unlikely to succeed if they fai l  to take into ac­
count both the potential for opportun istic po l it ical behavior and the 
inherent need of complex transact ions for contractual safeguards. 
They also examine TCP related to budget execution, tax pol icy and fiscal 
pol icy. They propose treating budgets as contracts where partic ipants have the 
attributes of bounded rat ional ity, opportunism, and lack of risk neutrality. The 
transactions occur under condit ions of uncertainty. b ilateral information 
asymmetry, and asset specificity (commitment to program cont inuity). 
Ambiguity & I nterpret ive Budgets (AMB) - Organizat ions are loosely cou­
pled and dec is ions are outcomes of mult ip le independent streams (see Garbage 
Can). Budgets invo lve r ituals and symbo ls to construct lisca l  real ity. The lan­
guage of analytic cho ice is merely metaphorical, helping to construct the per­
ception of order out of anarchy. 79 
79 Gerald J. Mil ler. Governmem financial management theory. Public administration and 
public policy 43 (New York: M. Dekker. 1 99 1 ): Janet Foley Orosz. "The Truth is Out There: 
Is Postmodern Budgeting the Real Deal?." in Evolving Theories of Public Budgeting. ed. John 
R. Bartle (Amsterdam : JAI imprint. 200 1 ). 
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EXPLANATORY THEORIES 
Median Voter Theory (MVT) - Voting is a method of g iving a decision 
making proxy to representatives. To obtain that proxy. the representative must 
convince a majority of voters to select him. The majority cons ists of 50% p lus 
one, or the median. Assuming that the voters have s ingle peaked preferences. 
the candidate need on ly learn and act upon the preferences of the med ian voter 
to become e lected and reelected. For budget ing, this means finding the tax and 
service package that satisfies the median voter. 80 
Interest Group Plura l ism (IGP) - I nterest r,oups take a d irect role in influ­
encing legis lati�n that a�ects the� interests.8 I�terest gro�1.ps are a tYpe of de­scendent of fact 1ons as d 1scussed m the Federalzst Papers. - The dommance of 
any particu lar faction wou ld be ruinous for a republ ic, but the competition of 
relatively equal fact ions is how democracy works. This competition and 
agreement over budgetary shares works in tandem with incrementalist theo­
ries. 83 
Garbage Can (GC) - A n  organized anarchy has i l l-defmed uncertain pref­
erences. unc lear techno logy and fluid participation. A decision is an outcome 
of independent streams: Problems arise ins ide and outside the organization and 
can have almost any nexus w ith the organization.  So lutions are someone's 
product looking for a question. Participants and their "energy leve l" are tem­
porarily associated w ith the organization .  And, choice opportunities are occa­
s ions that cal l  for a decision. In the garbage can, there are streams of each of 
these with decision opportunities possibly being demarked as d iscrete mo­
ments in t ime. Decis io ns occur when there are confluences of a l l  of these 
d . . 
. 84 streams at a ec!Sion po mt. 
Agendas (AGEN) - John Kingdon reformulates the Garbage Can theory 
(see) fmding three crit ical streams: problem recogn ition, pol icy development, 
80 B. Ward. "Majority rule and allocation. "  Journal of Conflict Resolution ( 1 96 1  ): G. Garvey. 
"The theory of party equil ibrium."  The American Political Science Review 60. no. I ( 1 966): 
ibid.; Paula S. Kearns and John R. Bartle, "The Median Voter Model in Public Budgeting 
Research," in Evolving Theories of Public Budgeting, ed. John R. Bartle (Amsterdam: JAI 
imprint, 200 I ). 
8 1  Robert A. Dahl, "Workers' Control of Industry and the British Labor Party." The American 
Political Science Review 4 1 .  no. 5 ( 1 94 7). 
8: James Madison et aL The federalist papers (Penguin classics. I 987) .. 
83 Irene S. Rubin, "Budgeting: Theory and Concepts," in Public Budgeting and Finance, ed. 
Robert T. Golembiewski and Jack Rabin (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1 995). 
84 Michael D. Cohen, James G. March. and Johan P. Olsen. "A Garbage Can Model of 
Organizational Choice," Administrative Science Quarterly 1 7, no. I ( 1 972).
-
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and pol it ics. 85 They work independently and must achieve confluence to open 
a policy w indow (an opportunity for dec ision making). 
Real Time B udgeting (RTB) - B udgeting involves five · ' l inked c lusters: 
revenues, process. expenditures. balance, and implementation."86 These semi­
independent streams interact in complex ways that stro ngly affect the abi l ity to 
make decis ions and the content of the decis ions themselves. There are info r­
mation dependencies between the streams which constrain decis ions. M icro­
issues (the cost of the operation of government) and macro- issues (fiscal po l i­
cy) constrain each other.87 Consequently, there must be constant real-time ad­
justment w ithin the semi-independent streams. 
Greedy B ureaucrat (GREED) - The most dominant budget theory from the 
publ ic choice, l iterature. the Greedy Bureaucrat theory holds that (top ranked) 
bureaucrats are uti l ity-maximizing ind iv iduals using the ir publ ic roles for the 
purpose of achieving their ut i l ity maximization purpose. 88 Bureaucrats have 
the advantage of asymmetric information with regard to how much resource is  
needed to achieve the outcomes desired by polit ical  dec ision makers and they 
are monopoly sel lers of the ir service, so they are in an excellent posit ion to 
overcharge. Their o n ly d ifficulty is that the overcharge cannot be realized in 
the form of profit, so instead it is realized in the form of prerequ is ites of of­
fice, generally higher salary. status and benefits assoc iated with larger, that is 
more expensive, organizat ions. 
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